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llE FEDERAL BUDGET, the Economic Report
of the President, and the Annual Report of the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers were presented recently
to Commgress -and the public.tm These three documents
represent the Administration’s national economic plan
for the eighteen-month period ending June 30. 1972.
Targets for total spending (CNP), output, prices, and
urmcmploynnent are presented along with a proposed
Federal budget program presumably consistent with
these goals. Underlying the statement of targets-and
the Federal budget plan is tum assumption regarding
the course of monetary-actions by the Federal Re-
serve Systenn.
Specific targets for the U. S. economy are set forth
by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in their
Annual Report.1 These goals, stated with reference
to second quarter 1972, consist of a reduction in the
unemployment rate to near 4.5 per cent of the labor
force and a reduction of the inflation rate, as measured
by the CNP deflator, to near a 3 per cent annual
rate. An 11 to 12 per cent annual rate of increase of
total spending (nominal GNP) fromn fourth quarter
1970 to second quarter 1972 is proposed as--a mneans
of achieving these targets. To rcalize this advance
of total spending, the CE~\ recommemids ‘an 8 per cent
anmiual rate of increase in Federal expenditures amId
a continuation of tile 5t o6per cent rate of monetary
expansion which prevailed in 1970.
This article evaluates the Administration’s national
economic plan with the aid of a methodology de-
veloped at tilis Bank. The 1970 economic plan is
compared with actual developments for purposes of
obtaining some perspective on stabilization plans and
realizations. Then, the 1971 economic plan is cx—
amninecl in termns of feasibility and internal consistency.
The St. Louis model is used to evaluate the Admin-
istration’s plan, thus any conclusions necessarily reflect
the particular characteristics of that methodology.
7 he Bnulce I of the t rotc d Statt s Got trnmcnmt I otal I LOT
Enidiog ionic 30, 1972 ( Covcrnonent Printing Office, 1971
and Ecooo one- Repe’rt of tine’ Preside,it, together ‘vitim The
Annual Report of tine Goon cii of Econonnit _‘lclciscr-s ( Cov—
ermnent Printing Office, 1971).
21971 CEA Report. p. 78.
compared with a 5 per cent advance in the previous
year, and unemployment rose fromn 3.6 per cent of
the labor ford-c in fourth quarter 1969 to 5.9 per cent
a year later. Total spending increased at a moderate
4 per cent rate in the first half of the year, then
stepped up to a 7 per cent rate in the second half
(after allowance for the depressing influence of the
auto strike in the fourth quarter) .~ Tile faster advance
of total spendimmg in time second half of the year was
fostered by more rapid monetary expansion and
increased growth of Federal spending beginning in
early 1970.
3
The CEA estonatedi the impact of the fourth quarter strike
to he approximately $14 billion, or that total spending ( CliP
would have risen at about a7per cent aanmmal rate from




Stabilization Actions and Economic
Developments in 1970
The recent Economic Report of tine President
diescrihcdl 1970 as a year of transition, when the U. S.
economy paid for tile excesses of 1966 through 1968.
The general level of prices rose 5.3 per cent
froims fourth quarter 1969 to fourth quarter 1970,
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F-Meal Actions
Fedlerai budget actions were moderately stimula-
tive ill 1970, as Fedlerai expenditures rose somewhat
faster than during the previous year. Accelerated
growth of Federal expenditures, along with expiration
of the 10 per cent tax surcharge, resulted in a slight
net fiscal stimulus durmg 1970.
Expenditures — Fedlerai spending ill 1970 was dom-
inated by dleveiopmnents in the second quarter. Effec-
tive ill April, hut retroactive to Jamluary 1, social
security benefits were increased at a $4.3 biHion an-
nual rate, and Federal empioyee compensation was
raised at a $2.5 billioml anmiual rate. The 7.1 per cent
increase in Federal spending during the year ending
fourth quarter 1970 compared with a 4.6 per cent rise
during the previous year and a 13.4 per cent average
annual rate of increase from 1965 to 1968.
The advance of Federal spending from iate 1969
to late 1970 reflected a 5.3 per cent decline in
defense spending and a 16 per cent rise in non-
defense spending, Defense spending had changed
little in 1969. after increasing at a 15 per cent average
annuai rate from 1965 to 1968. Nondefense spending
had advanced 8.4 per cent in 1969 following a 12.4
per cent average rate of increase from 1965 to 1968.
Receipts — The major actiomls -affecting budget rev-
enues were the two-step elimination of the 10 per
cent tax surcharge originally imnposed July 1, 1968,
and some net tax relief as a result of the Tax Re-form
Act of 1969. Expiration of the surcharge decreased
Federal receipts by an estimated 88.3 billion. This
action, along with sluggish growth in economic activ-
ity, resulted in a $9 billion dollar decline in Federal
receipts from fourth quarter 1969 to fourth quarter
1970.
Surplus/deficit position — The combination of ac-
celerated Fedleral spending, lower effective tax rates
for personal and corporate income, and a reduced
rate of advance of total spending in the economy,
resulted in a shift of the nationai income accounts
(NIA) budget from a $7.2 billion annual rate of
surplus in the second half of 1969 to a $14 billion
rate of deficit in the second half of 1970.
The $21 billion shift of budget position, as measured
by the NIA budget, tends to overstate the extent of
stimulus provided by the Federal budget. A substan-
hal portion of the 1969 to 1970 shift from surplus to a
deficit reflects the slowdown of the economy and is
thereby misleading as a measure of discretionary fiscal
action. Standardizing the estimates of expenditures
and receipts on a high-employment basis provides a
method of more accurately measuring the extent to
which discretionary Federal budget actions were
taken. On a high-employment basis, as estimated by
this Bank, the NIA budget moved, from a $10 billion
annual rate of surplus in the second half of 1969 to
a $7 hiHion rate in the second half of 1970,~By com-
parison, this measure of the Federal budget averaged
a $7.2 billion rate of deficit from 1966 to 1968.
Monetary Act-ions
Monetary actions in 1970 were quite expansive com-
pared with the previous year, but according to most
measures were less stimulative than in 1967 and
1968. The money stock increased 5.1 per cent during
the year ending fourth quarter 1970, compared with
3.8 per cent in the previous year and a 7 per cent
average rate of increase in 1967 and 1968.
4
Estimates of the high-employment budget are prepared by
this Bank and are published in our qimarterly release, “Fed-
eral Budget Trends.” These eslimates differ slightly from
those puhhshed in the 1971 CEA Report, pp. 24 and 73. For
further discussion of the high-employment budget concept,
see the 1971 CEA Report, pp. 70-74.
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Table I
Projected and Actual Changes in
Total Spending (GNPI
and Components --- 1969 to 1970
l Bll:oru of DoIIc~.n;
CEA
P rajoctiaa Artccl E
P~r5onc cor.sasp’,on $400 S~9.2 $0.8
B u~ir c~f.xed ir,ebtm 79 33 4.6
B..s,nenu ,nvcr’ar’v 09 5.0 4•~
P-won’ a conch, ‘hon 2 2 23 0.1
F~.dcroI D,jrcimeu .4 5 6 2 9
Stan’ acm local Pu c’wseu 11 10 11 4
caporPu 0.9 1.7 0.8
lotal spend.nc ~GNPl 52./ 45.1 7.6
(4&6l (4 1)’
I .1, id ,.r,..t.,.,..eI . ti.
was underestimation of the groxvth of Federal pur-
chases of goods and services.
Added relevance for stabilization policy is provided
by the CEA projections of real product, prices and
unemployment. Table II shows that the CEA pro-
jected an increase in real product from 1969 to 1970
of 1.2 per cent, a 4.4 per cent rise in the price level,
and a rise in the unemployment rate of .8 per cent.
Despite considerable success in projecting the growth
in total spending, the CEA failed to anticipate tile
continued strength of inflatioml and tile’ extent of
The CEA Report of a year ago projected a 5.7 per sluggish growth in real product andl enlpiovroent.
cent increase in total spending (CI’P) for calendar
1970 over 1969.1 The subsequent actual increase was
4.8 per cent, or, after adjusting for the effects of the
auto strike in the fourth quarter, 5.2 per cent. The
CEA anticipated a siow advance of total spending in
the first half followed by a quickened pace in the
second half. Apparently this pattern was realized,
though an accurate assessment is clouded by the
strike developments late in the year.
Tobl II
Projected and Actual Changes in Spending,





Tool pending (GNP~ 7 48 09/
Ralprodut 12 04 16
Pric 4.4 53 09
Iioeniptoyment rote 0.8 1 4 - 0.6 The CEA error of $7.6 billion in projecting the
growth of CNP front 1969 to 1970 was not huge,
considering that about $3.5 bilion was attributable to
the auto strike. A comparison of the actual changes Stabilization plans vs. realizations — To evaluate the
in the components of GNP with the CEA projections 1970 CEA projections and determine underlying
(Table I) indicates the primary source of error was sources of error, it is useful to compare monetary and
overestimation of business fixed investment and of in- fiscal plans with realizations. Table Ill gives planned
ventory accumulation. This type of forecasting error anti actual changes in the NIA budget from 1969 to
is common when the pace of economic actiyity is slow- 1970 on both an actual and a high-emnpiovmemlt basis.
ingtm business investment pians typically arc scaled F ron~the standpoimlt of fiscal plaits, the high-employ-
back at such timnes. ‘ihe otller source of error, which nient budget is more relevant. On tilis basis, expendi—
partly offset the error in tilt’ investment projection, tures increased $4.5 bilboml Imlore in i970 than planned.
- Comnhimmcd with a rluitc accurate projcd-tion of higil—
emplovmnent red’eipts, tile change im~ net position ~197OCE,k Report, Chapter 2.
Evaluation of Last Year’s National
Eco-noinic Plan
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Pro1ected Changes in Spending, Output, Prices
and Unemployment 1969 to 1970
Real Unemploy
Total Spendin! Product Price ment Rate
Billion, of
Dollars Pc cent P r Cent Per cent Per Cent
CEA Protect an (2/2/701 527 5.7 1 2 44 08
A tual 48.6 5.2 0.0 5 2 1 4
St Louis Model Proleclions
I) with changes in money
and Governm nI p nd
ing based on CEA
assumption 52.5 56 0.6 5 0 1.3
2) with changes in
Gay rnment spending
perf ctly perc wed but
nat changes in money 56.0 60 1 0 50 1 2
3) with hanges in money
perfectly p rceived but
not changes in Gov
rnment spending 53 I 57 07 5.0 1 3
4) with both changes in
money and Government
sp nding perfectly
perceived 566 6.1 10 50 12
rx Iu~ i ‘ fret ss i dE1~-tim c
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Table III
Planned and Actual Changes n Federal Budgets
1969 a 1970
(Billions of DoIIars~
Budget PIa A that Error
MA re eipts $ -0.6 $ 5.4 $ 48
NIA expenditures 96 150 54
NIA’ surplu o deficit - 102 204 10.2
High-employment receipt 11.0 104 06
High- mployment e penditures 8.7 132 45
High employment urplus
o deficit 2 3 2.8 1
No rt lbuei pin t,s’lilv. c ‘nm ‘nit1
‘Is. dmalnu ‘1sn~’ me sdby hi Bars. lb
mU —o PiP
turmicd out to h a sli”ist stimulus comp ncd 111th
plans For shirllt I-esUaint. This crrom ill fist m, I p1 inning
is not lam gc hone t r comnplredl xv iti1
some ill timt p ist.
lb CI\ assun-iptmon mhont inomif. tin tctions ill
1970 w is mlot spc cmfic at terms of a gi on tim m tte of the
mont x stock tbongb a rite cbout mu id—na~hetx e cml
tile hOe (IS rate ‘intl the r itt a tile ecomld ]laif of
1969 or ibout 4.n pci t tlit 11 15 Inlphe di “-lone
aetuills Licx - .1.1 pci cemlt honl fourth qu a t 1969
to fourth qu irtei 19~ 0. C 0mw qncnti~ the C E ~ pro
jc etion of mont t irs gronth 55 ‘15 quite xc hr ite.
tnalysi.s based on St. Louis mode! — ‘lo bcttc r an
derst-ind tilt signifieamlu of tbd difit r lice betn cell
projc etcd anti aetna I ebangt s imm hex cononnt 5’ tn a
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lInt this was not the primary source of error, according
to St. Louis methodology. Ill fact, tIlt’ project ions based
on policy assumptions \\c’re cioser to tile actual than
were tile project ions based on perfect koowiedge about
tilt’ coillse of tlmc’st’ policy actions. Realized omont’tarv
antI fiscal actions implied tllat tilt’ projections should
have heeml low- rather than high. As a result. based on
the St. Locus imlethodcllogv. the CE±\error in project-
ing total spending m’eflected factors other than errors in
projecting the course of nionc’tary and fiscal actions.
though the CE.A error iii projeetimlg total spt’ntling
n-as nclt large. there were larger errors ill projectimlg
the division of total spending growth between prices
and real product. Table IV shows prices, real prclduct.
and unemployment as projected amId realized. Real
product groxx’tim from calendar 1969 to 1970 was over-
estimated liv the CEA. a projc’ction of a 1.2 per cent
increase, eolnpared with 110 cilamlge in actual output
(excluding the effect of the fourth qesarter strike).
Umlemplovment ss-as forecast to rise to a 4.3 per cent
average for the year. hut turned omit to bc 4.9 11cr
cent. The rate of imlflatioml, on the other hand, was
underestimated. The CEA in earls- 1970 expected a
substantial improvement in price illflatioml over 1969,
projecting a 4.4 per tent increase. Prices actually’ rose
5.3 per cent from calemudar 1969 to 1970.
Table IV sbon-s that the projections for prices,
output. and unemployment based on St. Louis ale—
thoclologv Were more accurate than the CEA’s projec—
bles from 1969 to 1970, some alterna—
live’ simulations xx’ith tile St. Louis
methodology are examined.’ Four cases
are comisidereclt estimates based on (1
chamlgcs iml lllomlcv amlcl expenditures as
assumed by the CEA ill Febm-tmary 1970;
(2) perfect anticipation of changes in
Federal expenditures, hut not 111011ev;
(:3 perfect anticipation of charlges in
money, bust 110 t Federai expenditures;
and (4) perfect-anticipation of both
money and expenditures.
Examination of Table IV suggests
that the CEA was quite accurate ill
their total spending projection, mainly
because they assnmned an acceleration
in tile rate of monetary expansion ill
1970. Federal expenditures advanced
somewhat more rapidly than planmled,
01970 CE,A, Report, p. 60.
~“~\ Moimetarist Model for Economic Stahili—
-,,atiosi, this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-2o-
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tioils. Again, tin’ St. Louis projections were snore
accurate wilemi based Oil policy plans than when
calculatd’d with policy realizations. Nevertheless, de-
spite the error ill projecting total spending, the St.
Louis methodology forecast prices to rise 5 per cemit
from 1969 tdl 1970. or only slightly less tIiasl realized.
DIme to tile slow- short—run rd’sposlse of prices to monc—
tarv and fiscal actions ill tin’ St. I~ouis model, these
pride’ prdljectiolls were relatix-ely insensitis’e to tile dif-
ference between policy plans ‘and realizations.
St. Louis model projectiomus dlf real prodcmct growth
n-crc in error liv about the samlle amonslt as tile CEA.
By past projection experience, neither of tile projec-
dons for real product, by the CEA or b tile St. Louis
methodology, were in substantial error, ‘l’he differ-
ences between the projections by file CEA and St.
Louis of real product translated into larger discrepan-
cies in the projection of unemployment. The CEA
correctly foresaw the rise in unemployment but under-
estimated its magnitude. The St. Louis model forecast
the rise with considerable accuracy, even with a pro-
jection of real product growth similar to that by the
CEA.
Summary — Tile CEA projected quite closely the
growth of total spending, even though they under-
estimated the rise in Federal purchases from 1969 to
1970 by $3 billion. Their errors were significant, how-
ever, with respect to projections of inflation and
unemployment. Tile magnitude of these errors was
typical of niost forecasts, including those of large
econometric models. As indicated in the 1971 CEA
Annual Report, the inflation proved to be macil more
stubborml than anticipated. As a r’suit, all of the ad-
vance in td)tal spending mnanifestt’d itself in price in-
creases, and output dcl not grow at all, resulting in a
much sharper ruse m~cmnd’mpioyment than anticipated.
The St. Louis model, which has built into it a yen’
slow price response, also underestimnated the rate of
inflation. For this one year, howeyer, it came closer
than tile CEA in its projection of inflation and un-
employolemlt, diespite tile fact that the St. Louis model
(lid1 not do as well in projecting the change in total
spending.
Economic Goals and Policy Plans for 1971
Tue Administration has set targcts of 4.5 per cent
unemployment and a 3 per cemlt rate of inflation by
second quarter 1972. To achieve these goals, a 9 per
cent advance of total spending from calendar 1970 to
1971 has been projd’ctedl. This section summarizes the
Federal Budget program for calendar 1971, and tien
c’valuates the Adnlinistrationi’s plan with the aid of the
St. Louis methodology.
Federal Budget Progra-m for Calendar 1971
The budget plan fdlr calendar 1971 calls for a sur-
plus in the high-employment ( NIA) budget of $6.5
billion, as estimated by this Bank.5 A surplus of this
magnitude would be about tile same as ill 1970. \%‘hen
compared with calendar 1969, the budget plan ap-
pears slightly mnore expansionary, lImIt conlpared with
the 1966 to 1968 period, wheml the high-esnploynlent
budlget was substantially in deficit, tile budget for
eudendar 1971 appears much less expansionary.
Expenditures — Tile budget plan projects an 8.4 per
cent increase im~Federal expenditures from calendar
1970 to calendar 1971. This increase would he up
slightly from the 6.6 per cent rise in 1969 and 1970,
but much less than the 14 per cent average rate of
advance iml Federal spending from 1965 to 1968. The
1971 increase ill Federal expenditures translates into
about a 1 per cent advance in real terms, compared
with a 1.3 per cent decrease in real terms in 1970,
Defense spending is projected to decline abocmt
5 per cent in calendar 1971, compared with a 3 per
cent diechne in 1970 and a 1 per cemlt increase in
1969. The average annual rate of adlvanec frdlm 1965
to 1968 was-a yen’ rapid 16 per cent. Estimnates for
1971 apparentiy reflect declines in Vietnam spending,
5The Administration’s iusdget program is discussed as it relates
to calendar 1971 rather tllan fiscal 1972, with estimates for
calendar 1971 prepared by this Bank. Furthenissore, to lIe
consistent xvith the CNP accouslts, which represent the frame-
work in which tile CEA projections are made, tile Federal
sector of tile national income accounts ( NIA budget), rather
than tile umfiedl budget, is nsed to summarize Federal budget
plans. For a summary of the bisdiget program On a fiscal year
basis, along with rate—of—change triangles, see the quarterly
release (If this Bank, “Federal Budget Trends,” Felmsary 1971.
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though no figures are given in the budget as to their
magnitude.
Federal spending on civilian programs, that is, non-
defense spending, is planned to rise 16.5 per cent
from calendar 1970 to 1971. This increase would
follow increases of 15 per cent in 1970 and 9 per cent
in 1969. From 1965 to 1968, nondefense spending rose
at a 12 per cent average annual rate. 1971 expendi-
tures fdI~ nondefense purposes reflect proposed in-
creases in social security benefits and a pay raise for
Federal employees, both effective January 1, and an
increase in grants-in-aid to state and local govern-
ments (general revenue-sharing), effective October 1.
Receipts — Federal receipts on a national income
accounts basis are projected to rise $18 billion from
calendar 1970 to 1971, or by 9 per cent. This projec-
tion is closely associated with the assumption about
the growth of total spending (CNP)
I hi V
Plcmnntd Clnmx~as in F ci ref kecsp 19 Gb 197~
NOhGOOI lncotne Aces budget
f~toss etee ~
Ck* gem ten rec p4e - 3
Clings dues ‘gre tim -- 1-9
Chsroge dime S Sex rote thong. 1 S
Per Ito edao~e l’etelps - 5
orpo etc p ~ftt. lox ocerep 2 6
Indrrect binsla ~ 10 od no to* rs~ol 02
Cool ibunosis of SOCIOI fIn, onc $t
Table V shows the sources of increased receipts for
1971. Changes in tax policy include (1) the sched-
uled increase in social security taxes, which was effec-
tive January 1, (2) a proposed expansion of the base
for social security taxes, from $7,800 to $9,000, (3)
continuing the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
and (4) the effect of liberalized depreciation allow-
ances, tending to reduce receipts. The combined effect
of these tax changes is expected to decrease receipts
by $1.8 billion in 1971. All of the expected increase in
receipts reflects the rapid expansion of economic
activity projected lIy the Administration.
Surplus/deficit position — The NIA budget is prdl-
jected to lie in deficit by $10.6 billion in calendar
1971, compared with a deficit of $11.1 billion in 1970.
Since the NIA budget is influenced to a considerable
extent by the pace of economic activity, it is useful to
estimate receipts and expenditures on a high-employ-
nlent basis. By eliminating the effects of deviations
in real economic activity from high-employment,
budget plans can be assessed more accurately in terms
of their economic impact.
On a high-employment basis, the planned NIA
budget indicates a $6.5 billion surplus for calendar
1971. This estimate is about the same as for 1970,
mdicatimlg no change in the degree of fiscal stimulus
from 1970 to 1971.
The Federal budget program for calendar 1971 ap-
pears to contain about the same amount of stimulus
as did the program in 1970. Whether the impact of
such a programn will turn out to be essentially un-
changed from 1970 depends largely upon Congres-
sional action as well as the lag structure of economic
reaction. Developments in Southeast Asia and domes-
tic demands for Government programs are of vital
importance mill determinimlg the actual course of Fed-
eral spending.
Evaluation of 1971 National
Economic Plan
Using the St. Louis methodology, two questions are
considered in the evaluation of the 1971 economic
plan of the Administration: (1) whether the price
and unemployment goals are consistent with the pro-
jected increase in total spending: and (2) whether the
projected increase in total spending is consistent with
proposed stabilization policies.
Feasibility of total spending goal — TalIle VI shows
the results for the St. Louis model for four different
combinations of policies
(1) an increase of Federal spending as proposed
ii’s the budget and an expansion of the money
stock at a 6 per cent annual rate;
Page 162 ) all increase (If Federal spending as llropdlsedi
and a faster 8 per ceslt rate of expansion of the
money stock;
(3) a faster islcrease of Federal spending than pro-
posed
1 and a 6 per cent rate of expaslsioo dlf the
money stock; and
4 ) both’s a faster ind-rease of Ferferal spending than
proposed ammd an 8 per ceot nate dlf expaslsion
dlf the moslev stock.
According to the St. Louis methodology (Table VI),
the planned policies would not yield a growth in total
spending of 9 ~ cemit in 1971. Since the model is
subject to error, the cluestion arises whether this dlis-
crepancy is within the range of possible error. For this
purpose, the mnodcl was used to forecast one year
ahead, dluarter by quarter from 1966 through 1970.
The largest error ill prediction of total spending was
$8 billion, or substamitially less than the $20 billion
discrepancy between the CEA projection and tise St.
Louis model projection based on their policy assump-
tions,9 The possilIilit~of error in the St. Louis model
cannot lie ruled out, but it seems most likely that
cdlmstinuation of monetary and fiscal stimnulus in 1971
of roughly the san~emagnitudle as we had in 1970
will not foster a sharp acceleration ill growth of total
spending in 1971. Because the mnonctary and fiscal
restraint of 1968 and 1969 is fading into the past,
tdltal spemidling is prdljected to advance snore rapidly
in 1971 than in 1970, but not markedly so.
°‘l’hcsefdlrecasts were llased on estimation of tIme total spend-
ing equation for a sample peridld through 1966, then 1967,
etc., and using actual issoney and expenditures to generate
the forecasts dlutside of the sample period. Perhaps more
relevant for the current situation is the performance of the
model around hsssiness cycle turning points. Within the sam-
ple peridld of 1953 tdl 1970, tile average error for the foisr—
qoanten period following business cycle trdlughs was $5.3
billion, or 1 per cent dlf CNP in the four-quarter period
ending with the trough quarter.
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To determine If some othes comhina
tion of policies might not yield thd
lrgetd d gro\sth of total spending the
imp let of ‘sltdin itu c pohcx issump
tsons vi is cx mmnni~d vi ith the St Louis
ni thodlolog\ T thld \ I suggd sts ti’sit
the combination of more expansionary
monetus and fiscal ictions vlcldls a
total spending projection closer to the
CEA’s, hut it still falls short by a sub-
stantial amount.
Implications of CEA total spending
goal — The 1970 economic plan was in
001 primarily viith respect to its dis
trihution of total spending change be-
tuecu prlc~~s mdl mc il product To
assess the implications of the St. Louis
me thodlologx (dIm I d ii pi oduct ~l lcd S Slid
1
ilIldmplos
mc. nt thc CL 1 p~ Oldctions dlf tot il spending Vi (Sc
mssumcd fos t
1
u St Lotus modd I %Vithout concemn
for hdIvi thd tdlt if spending is going to lid -ichic s ci d
I able \ II shovis thc Implid ci paths for re il product
pi ices md um~~ mlllo\ nlc nt Ill
kccordmg to thcsc cstim mtcs based on the St Lows
model real product would risc ibout 4 per ccnt from
cmknd’sr 1970 to calcndmr 1971 compared smith thc
(‘LA projection of 46 per cdnt As a result the St
Louis model suggests unemployment would average
5.5 per cent in calendar 1971, or slightly above the
CEA projection of 5.3 per cent. Furthermore, the St.
Louis model indicates that the CEA projection of total
spending would lead to a 4.9 per cent advance of
prices in 1971, compared with the CEA estimate of
4.2 per cent.
The difference between the CEA projections and
those based on the St. Louis methodology becomes
more evident when examined with referemice to 1972.
The CEA projections imply that real product would
continue its strong advance in 1972, rising 7.7 per cent
above 1971, and push the nnennpfoyment rate down to
a 4.1 per cent average for the year. The St. Louis
model also indicates a rapid increase of real product,
hut at a slower 6 per cent rate of advance. Unemploy-
ment would be reduced for 1972 to 5.1 per cent of the
labor force. in sharp edlntrast with the CEA projection
of a 3.4 per cent increase in prices in 1972, thc St.
Louis model shows a 5.2 per cent increase.
°Cft~~ the proposedf Federal budget program, the St. Louis
modlel indicates that a 12 per cent rate of increase in
money Ileginning in first quarter 1971 would
1
lIe rerpmired
to achieve the CEA projection of a9per cent increase in
GNP in calendar 1971.
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toOl VI
Projected Changes ta Total Spending (ON?) — 1970 to 1972
l970*o 1971 1971 to 1972
Si
t ions f Per eta Bitton of P Ceos
UoiIe Irs a C D~ll0r In roG
CM Projcli ti t 27 ~ taB 90 1 0~9 11
loin Mod Prolecson
if vrithópe ti mar,eygowh
and Go rnos tp ndnsg
bo ~o fistt 1972 Osm g
(CM pokcy as unspheit ) 676 69 779 75
o h8per nfmensygm Sb
rind Geveromn at pond rig
bad atm 119 budgI 74 7 995 95
) rth~p teatinury
growth etsd ci orated
G rnma Ip ding 7 73 819 78
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Proiected Changes in. Spending, Output, Prices and Unemployment 1970 to 1972
(Per Cent
1971 ______ 1972
I II III IV Yea II Sit IV Year
CM Proiection (2/2. 71)
TotalSpending 130 115 118 1 3 90 117 112 110 105 114
P alPodut 94 68 77 7.3 46 80 78 77 75 77
Pr’ s 32 44 38 37 42 34 31 3.1 28 34
Un mplayrnent Rat 57 5 52 4.9 53 4.7 4.5 42 40 4.4
St Lovi Model Prot lions
1) with CM total spending
as urnption
Total Spending 130 11.5 118 113 90 117 112 11.0 Ui 11,4
RerslProdut 85 8.1 63 59 39 62 59 58 55 6.0
Prie 41 51 52 52 49 5.2 5. 50 49 52
UnemploymentRate 5.6 56 5 5.4 55 53 51 50 49 51
2) with 6 pert nt non y 9 owfl,
and Gave nm it sp nding bo ed
an fiscal 1972 budget
(CM policy a uinptsons)
Talc Spending 11.1 64 91 72 69 69 81 73 70 75
RealPoduct 76 2.0 47 30 2.5 29 44 37 37 35
Prices 32 43 42 41 4.3 39 37 34 32 3.8
Unemployment Rate 5.6 5.8 5.9 59 58 60 61 61 6.1 61
ii rhr r ‘tots,nilin on t ndpiee r t olnoon C nnulrat ‘onmot -in t NI-
Qoasti t n tim Ii hi nan no thea an jflo 5o to ~ooni r. ml I n
h CEA
Summary
The Administration has forecast tisat the U. S. ceo—
miomy in 1971 will attain reductiomis of umlempioyment
and imiflation simultaneously. To achieve these goals,
a rapid expansion of total spending has been proposed.
According to methodology des-eloped at this Bamik,
the projected increase in total spending is not consist-
ent witll the policy actions proposed by the Adimin—
istration. A much slower increase is more likely.
Furthermore, when the targeted increase of total
spending is accepted (which is only possible in the
St. Louis model with a very rapirl acceleration of
monetary and/or fiscal stimulus), the goals for tin—
enlplovmemlt and prices also appear too optimistic.
Our model suggests that such a policy of rapid spend-
ing growth would lower unemployment, hut inflation
would continue unabated,
Tie mlation is faced with a serious dilemma, hut a
search for quick and easy solutions may lie self—
defeating. The current inflation developed persistently
over a substantial period of time. For this reason the
current problem defies a fast and smooth adljustnlent
to high employment with price stalli]ity. Monetary
actions consisting of a 5 to 6 per cent annual rate of
growth in mnoney. and fiscal aetidlmls consistimlg of an S
per cemlt annual rate of advance in Federal expendi-
tures, appear to be consistent with an orderly, but
In summary, introducing the CEA projection of slow, return to a viable high-employment path. The
total spending into tile St. Louis model leads to the post World \Var II economic experience does not mdi-
conclusion that such a policy of rapid spending growth cate that the present unemployment-inflation dilemma
would provide slight gains in reducing unemploy— can be solved as quick]m’ as the CEA has suggested.
roemit. How-ever, such gains would he at the cost of no
gains in the battle against inflation. An Appendix to this article is on the next page.
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ALTERNATIVE BUDGET CONCEPTS
All references to tise Federal budget in the preceding
article as-c iii I en Os of the national incoine accounts
budget. This appendix discusses three budget concepts
to provide tise reader with all understanding of their
iistes-relations.
Unified Budget
The unified budget was adopted as the Government’s
basic plamnsing document in January 1968. replacing both
the adlninistl-ative and consolidated cash budgets. Ex—
pendhtssres and receipts are recorded on a cash basis (when
the cilecks are issuedi or the payment received). This
budget will lie preseisted on an accrual basis after ac-
counting procedures are revised’. Net transactions of
trust funds are mciuderl in this budget._kll lending ac-
tivities of the Goverisment as well as certain Government—
spoissored agencies are dlescribedi ~O the unified budget,
but only certairs direct loans are incluriedl in the figures
for total ontlmsys (expendhtures plus net lending). (For a
complete discussion of Fedierai lending activities see
“Special Analysis E in Special Anolijses: Budget of the
US. ~ risent, lw-al Yea, 7972).
The unified budget is presented to Comlgress for ap-
proval liv tile Presirient in January or February of ever”
year, for the fiscal year eisding June 30, eighteen months
hence. Also inclodiedi are revised figures for the current
fiscal ~‘ear ending approximately six months later. Tile
Office of Management and Ilurlget normally revises tile
budget figures for the cotnislg fiscal ‘ears ill the spring
anrl fall of every year. Tile current data’ are publislied
liv the Treasury Department (In a nsoisthlv basis.
A~ationaiIncome Accounts Budget
The slational ilconle accounts ( NIA ) budget presents
tise receipts and expeuchtures of tile Federal Govern-
nient as all integrated part of the economy, as represented
liv ti 5e national iiseome alid p riIdluct aeeous slt 5. the in aior
dhfierenees hctween the NIA hudiget aildl tile unified
budget are: (1) the MA budget excludes all lending
transactions; (2) tax receipts in the NIA budget are, ill
generai, recorded on an accrual basis (corporate income
taxes are accrued uvllen the income is earner1 natller than
when the Government receives payment, and personal
ileossle taxes, most of wilicb are uvithlieid fronl eanlings
or pai~i on a quarterly basis, are recol-ded when the
taxpayer snakes paymemlt ) ; (3) dIn tile expenditure side,
rlefense purchases are reeordled when ti1e items are re—
celled
1
ily tile Goyerslsssent ratiler than when tilev are
1nodmerl or paid for.
The NIA budget is developed in conjuilctidln \vitil tile
i-est of the natiosal inconse ar’eounts by the Department
of COiilnlerce. it is 1luillislled 051 a quarterly basis, sea—
sonaliv adijusted at aslnual rates. (“Special Analysis A” in
the fiscal 1972 budget contains a roore detailed descrip-
tion of the recomsciiiiitiosl of the Inlifiedi budget with the
NIr~husciget. )
IIi.gh-E;nployment Budget
The higb-ernpiovineilt budget is based On the NIA
budget; ilowever, it is- adijusted to remove tlle effects (If
the Id-el (If economic activity oss the NIA budget. For
example, during a recession NIA receipts will tend to
fall ill response to ldlwer levels of income, and NIA cx—
pendiitures for nnemplovmeslt Ileslefits will rise. The re—
.suitissg move tow-and deficit ill the NI1~lludget, however,
implies expansionary policies \vhesl, in fact, the opposite
nngllt lie occurring.
The isigh—enlpiovinent budget reflects primarily dis—
cretionas- changes ill fiscal policy. ssieil as a change in
the tax rate structure or a c-llange irs tile patterul of cx—
peisditures. The high—enl1liovislent linuriget estimates pui~—
hslsed liv this Bank- are liaserl on potential gross national
pnodusct as defined liv the Council of Econdlmic Advisers.
In their 1970 Annual Repast, rile CEA defined potential
GNP as the output of the ecomlonly at a 3.8 per cent
nnempiov-nlerst rate. Inconle shares and tax rates, esti-
mated at high—ensplovment levels, are applied to poten-
tial CNP in current doilars to arrive at the high—employ-
ment budget data. Such data are not published regularly
liv any Government agency. Estimates psepared by this
Bank are published in the quarterly release, “Federal
Budget Trends.”
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The gray-screened portion of the- following table was incorrect as published
on page 18 of the March 1971 issue of this REVIEW. The outlined portion of the
table shows the correct figure-s (svith the- incorrect figures, as originally published,
in parentheses). All other figures in the- table- sve-re- correct, and are- re-produced
be-low. The conclusions of the article, though not altered fundamentally, we-re-
modified in the- direction of making the difference between the- CEA projection
and the St. Louis model projection, based on the- CEA total spending assumption,
slightly less pronounced than indicated in the article-. We- thank Frank C. Ripley,
Senior Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers, for pointing out this error.
Table VII
PROJECTED CHANGES IN SPENDING, OUTPUT, PRICES AND UNEMPLOYMENT— 1970 to 1972
(Per cent’)
______ 1971 _______ 1972 ______________
I II Ill IV Year I II III IV Year
CEA Proiection
(2/2/71)
Total Spending 13.0% 11.5% 11.8% 11.3% 9.0% 11.7% 11.2% 11.0% 10.5% 11.4%
Real Product 9.4 6.8 7.7 7.3 4.6 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.7
Prices 3.2 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.4
Unemployment
Rate 5.7 5.5 5.2 4.9 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.4
St. Louis Model Proiections
1) with CEA total
spending
assumption
Total Spending 13.0 11.5 11.8 11.3 9.0 11.7 11.2 11.0 10.5 11.4
Real Product 9.3(8.5) 68(6,1) 7.0(6.3) 65(59) 44(3.9) 6.8(62) 4.3(59) 61(58) 57(55) 6.5(60)
Puces 3.5(41) 4.5(5.1) 46(52) 4.6(52) 4.4(49) 4.6(52) 47(51) 47(50) 47(4S) 4.6(52)
Unemployment
Rote 5.6(5.6) 56(5.6) 54(55) 52(54) 55(5.5) 51(53) 49(5 I) 47(50) 44(4.9) 4.8(Sfl
2) with 6 per cent
money growth and
Government spend-
ing based on fiscal
1972 budget (CEA
policy assumptions)
Total Spending 11,1 6.4 9.1 7.2 6.9 6.9 8.1 7.3 7.0 7.5
Real Product 7.6 2.0 4.7 3.0 2.5 2.9 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.5
Prices 3.2 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.8
Unemployment
Rote 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1
~i~er cent changes for total spending, output and prices are at compounded annual sates’, unemployment rates are levels.
~~Quas’terIy pattern estimated by this Bank based on the 1971 Assnual Rrysorc of the Gousscit of Kcouo,ssic Advises’s ansi amplifying statements by
the CEA.
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